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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
Nos. 13-2340/13-2341/13-2584 
____________ 
 
IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENLURAMINE) 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
                                    Jeanette Pearson,  
                                                                 Appellant No. 13-2340  
    Christeen Rightnar,  
        Appellant No. 13-2341   
     Janice Phillips,  
        Appellant No. 13-2584                                   
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2-99-cv-20593, 2-16-md-01203 and 2-11-md-01203) 
 
District Judge: Harvey Bartle, III 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 9, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, COWEN and TASHIMA,
*
 Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 15, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
*
The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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 Jeanette Pearson (“Pearson”), Christeen Rightnar (“Rightnar”), and Janice Phillips 
(“Phillips”) (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal an Order1 of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying their recovery under the terms of 
the Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement 
Agreement”).  We will affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 This case is part of an ongoing multi-district litigation concerning a diet drug, 
called "Pondimin," which was previously sold by Wyeth.
2
  Pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement, Wyeth was required to contribute funds for the payment of claims brought by 
individuals negatively affected by their diet drugs.  The AHP Settlement Trust (the 
"Trust") was responsible for administering and reviewing a claimant's submissions to 
determine eligibility for benefits under the Settlement Agreement. 
 In order to qualify for compensation under the Settlement Agreement, a claimant 
must submit a completed Green Form to the Trust, which requires: (1) information from 
                                              
1
 The District Court denied Pearson's claims on March 26, 2013, Rightnar's claims 
on April 4, 2013, and Phillips' claims on May 10, 2013.  Their claims on appeal were 
briefed together and will be resolved together, but will be referred to individually as 
necessary. 
2
 Prior to March 11, 2002, Wyeth was known as American Home Products 
Corporation. 
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the claimant's representative; (2) information regarding the claimant's medical condition, 
to be completed by the claimant's attesting physician; and (3) information from the 
claimant's attorney where applicable.  Appellants, who were each prescribed the diet drug 
and ingested it over the course of several months, individually sought compensation 
benefits under the Settlement Agreement. 
 In their Green Form submissions, Appellants' physicians confirmed that each 
Appellant underwent an echocardiogram.  Pearson's physician noted that her 
echocardiogram showed moderate mitral regurgitation and an abnormal left atrial 
dimension.  Both Rightnar's and Phillips's physicians noted that their echocardiograms 
demonstrated moderate mitral regurgitation and an ejection fraction of 50-60%. 
 The Trust referred Pearson's Green Form submission to its auditing cardiologist, 
who concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for her attesting physician's 
conclusions.  Pearson sent additional information (i.e., affidavits from two other 
cardiologists) in hopes of a different response, but she received the same response.  The 
auditing cardiologist who reviewed Rightnar's Green Form submission at first concluded 
that her attesting physician's conclusions had a reasonable medical basis.  However, her 
claim fell into a category that required re-auditing
3
 of claims and was later denied due to 
                                              
3
 The District Court noted that Pretrial Order ("PTO") No. 5632 (Aug. 26, 2005) 
authorized the Trust to re-audit the claims of certain Diet Drug Recipients, including 
Rightnar, who opted out of the Seventh Amendment to the Settlement Agreement but did 
not elect to submit the initial audit of their claims to the Claims Integrity Process, based 
upon the Trust's allegations that the initial audits were not reliable.   
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lack of a reasonable medical basis for her attesting physician's notations.  Rightnar's 
attempts to submit additional affidavits from three other cardiologists likewise failed.  
Phillips' auditing cardiologist also concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis 
for her attesting physician's conclusions regarding her ejection fraction, but he did find a 
reasonable medical basis for his answer of moderate mitral regurgitation.  Her claim was 
denied based upon the auditing cardiologist's finding regarding her ejection fraction and 
her additional attempts to submit affidavits were rejected. 
 Following their respective denials, Appellants filed notices of dispute regarding 
the Trust's audit determinations.  The Trust then applied for an Order from the District 
Court requiring Appellants to Show Cause as to why their claims should be eligible under 
the Settlement Agreement.  The District Court issued that Order and referred each claim 
to the Special Master for further proceedings. 
 The Special Master assigned a Technical Advisor
4
 to review all documents 
submitted by the Trust and the claimants and to prepare a report for the District Court.  In 
those reports, the Technical Advisor concluded that there was no reasonable medical 
basis for Pearson's attesting physician's representation that she had moderate mitral 
regurgitation, and that there was no reasonable medical basis for both Rightnar's and 
Phillips' attesting physicians' representations that they had a reduced ejection fraction. 
                                              
4
 Under the Audit Policies and Procedures set forth in PTO 2457, see App. at 
A1772, "the Special Master may assign a Technical Advisor to review the Special Master 
Record and prepare a report to the Court setting forth his/her opinions regarding the 
issue(s) in dispute in the audit," see App. at A1787.   
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 After reviewing the entire Show Cause record for each Appellant, which included 
the Technical Advisor's reports, the District Court issued detailed Memorandum Opinions 
concluding that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that there was a 
reasonable medical basis for their attesting physicians' findings.  Three separate Orders 
were then entered affirming the Trust's denials of their claims for benefits under the 
Settlement Agreement. 
 These appeals followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over all terms of the Settlement Agreement 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1407.  We exercise jurisdiction over a final order of the 
District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “We review a [d]istrict [c]ourt’s exercise of its equitable authority to administer 
and implement a class action settlement for abuse of discretion.”  In re Diet Drugs, 543 
F.3d 179, 184 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 
188, 192 (3d Cir. 2000)). “[T]o find an abuse of discretion [a] [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision 
must rest on ‘a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.’”  Id. (quoting In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 
645 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 
 
  
6 
III. 
 Appellants set forth two arguments on appeal: (1) that the District Court abused its 
discretion in concluding that there was no reasonable medical basis for their attesting 
physicians' Green Form findings; and (2) that the District Court abused its discretion by 
allowing the Technical Advisor to submit new evidence and resolve a disputed issue of 
fact.  We disagree with both of these contentions. 
1. 
 "Once the Trust denies a claim and the claim advances to a show cause 
proceeding, the claimant has the burden of proving there was a reasonable medical basis 
for the attesting physician's representations."  Id. at 189; see also App. at A1785.  The 
District Court in the instant proceedings both acknowledged and applied this standard in 
each of its Orders.  The record makes clear that the District Court assessed all of the 
medical opinions presented before it and that its denial was based wholly on Appellants' 
failure to rebut certain assessments that supported the opinions of those opposing their 
claims, i.e., both the auditing cardiologists and the Technical Advisor.  See, e.g., App. at 
A13, A27, A41 ("Mere disagreement with the auditing cardiologist and Technical 
Advisor without identifying any specific errors by them is insufficient to meet a 
claimant's burden of proof.").  Without such a showing by Appellants, they cannot 
demonstrate that the only conclusion that may be drawn from their echocardiograms is 
that of their attesting physicians.  The record, therefore, leaves open the question of 
  
7 
whether there is a reasonable medical basis for Appellants' attesting physicians' Green 
Form responses.  For that reason, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its 
discretion in concluding that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proving that there 
was a reasonable medical basis for their attesting physicians' Green Form findings. 
2. 
 We also find no merit in Appellants' contention that the District Court abused its 
discretion by allowing the Technical Advisor to submit new evidence and resolve a 
disputed issue of fact. 
 "[T]rial judges in the federal system possess[] 'inherent power to provide 
themselves with  appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,' 
including the power to 'appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the 
performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause.'"  
Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Peterson, 253 
U.S. 300, 312 (1920)).  These advisors are not witnesses and, therefore, may not 
contribute to evidence in a given case.  See id.  Nor are they judges, "so they may not be 
allowed to usurp the judicial function."  Id. (citing Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 
(1889) (noting that a court may not "abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment 
the controversy presented" through appointment of advisors).  "[T]he advisor's role is to 
[merely] act as a sounding board for the judge – helping the jurist to educate himself in 
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the jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony and to think through the critical 
technical problems."  Id. at 158. 
 After reviewing the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and the Show Cause 
record, we are confident that the District Court carefully considered the entire record and 
reached its conclusion largely independent of the Technical Advisor.  As noted above, the 
District Court's decision was premised upon Appellants' failure to refute assessments of 
both the auditing cardiologists and the Technical Advisor.
5
  We find no impropriety in 
the District Court's reliance on the Technical Advisor's report. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Appellants' claims under the Settlement Agreement.  
                                              
5
 Appellants also contend that the District Court "merely rubber stamped" the 
Technical Advisor's finding that there was no reasonable medical basis for their 
diagnoses.  They point to the fact that the District Court has previously adopted the 
Technical Advisor's findings concerning claims arising under the Settlement Agreement a 
total of 192 times out of a possible 193.  We find this argument unavailing to their cause, 
as that point does little to assist in our review of the instant appeals.  In spite of that, we 
find no evidence in this record which demonstrates a mere "rubber stamping" of the 
Technical Advisor's opinion. 
